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COMMERCE POWER TO ENCOMPASS
NONECONOMIC CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Nathan W. Shackelford*
N United States v. Nascimento,1 the First Circuit held that a convic-
tion under the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") 2 is constitutional as applied to noneconomic criminal con-
duct under a 'substantial effects' Commerce Clause analysis. 3 The First
Circuit's decision incorrectly harmonizes recent Commerce Clause juris-
prudence; empowers Congress with carte blanche authority to regulate all
intrastate, noneconomic activity simply by encompassing the conduct as
an offshoot of a larger regulatory scheme; and allows for federal regula-
tion of conduct traditionally reserved to the several states.
The defendant, Jackson Nascimento, was a member of the Stonehurst
gang in Boston, Massachusetts, which engaged in a gang war over a two
year period with its rival the Wendover gang.4 The ensuing violence be-
gan in 1995 when Nardo Lopes, a member of the Wendover gang, shot
and killed Bobby Mendes. 5 At the time of the slaying, Nardo's brother,
Augosto Lopes, was incarcerated for an unrelated offense. 6 After his re-
lease, Augosto decided to kill any potential witnesses to the slaying who
could testify against his brother.7 To accomplish this, he began associat-
ing with members of the Stonehurst gang, and upon learning that the
gang "had problems" with Wendover, Augosto incited a gang war hoping
to eliminate potential Wendover witnesses.8 The violence lasted from
1998 to 2000, and many members of both gangs lost their lives. 9
In September 2004, thirteen suspects were indicted, including Nasci-
mento, with the main charge being a RICO violation because of their
* J.D. Candidate 2009, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
3. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42-43.







membership in Stonehurst. 10 The indictment charged that the primary
purpose of the enterprise was "to shoot and kill members, associates, and
perceived supporters" of the Wendover gang.1 The indictment also al-
leged that the Stonehurst gang had an additional purpose of selling drugs,
but the trial court found the government's evidence insufficient as matter
of law to prove that the Stonehurst gang-as an entity-sold illegal
drugs. 12 The government eventually brought charges against seven indi-
viduals in federal district court for racketeering, conspiracy to commit
racketeering, conspiracy to commit murder in the aid of racketeering in
violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute
("VICAR"), 13 a VICAR assault charge, and the use of a firearm in the
commission of a violent crime. 14
At trial, there was evidence that Stonehurst possessed an arsenal of at
least nine weapons its members had used to commit murder, and that on
one occasion a member traveled to another state to purchase a weapon.
15
The jury found the other three individuals-including Nascimento-
guilty of RICO violations and conspiracy to violate RICO violations. 16
Nascimento appealed, arguing among other points that the prosecution
of an enterprise under the RICO statute for noneconomic criminal con-
duct is unconstitutional.1 7 Affirming the trial court, the First Circuit
looked to recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence for gui-
dance before concluding that the RICO statute withstands constitutional
scrutiny as applied to an enterprise's noneconomic criminal conduct.
18
The majority distinguished the facts of the case from recent Supreme
Court decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.19
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's latest Commerce Clause deci-
sion in Gonzales v. Raich, the court reasoned that as-applied challenges
to a general regulatory statute will not prevail as long as the statute "itself
deals rationally with a class of activity that has a substantial relationship
to interstate or foreign commerce."'20
The Nascimento majority framed the issue as whether "the RICO stat-
ute, as applied to an enterprise engaged exclusively in noneconomic crim-
inal activity, is unconstitutional. ' 21 To be found guilty of a RICO
violation, the prosecution must establish that: "(1) an enterprise existed;
(2) the enterprise participated in or its activities affected interstate com-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at n.1 ("[T]he evidence at trial indicated that while individual Stonehurst mem-
bers had engaged in drug trafficking, Stonehurst itself had not.").
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000).
14. Id. at 31.
15. Id. at 44-45.
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id. at 40.
18. See id. at 40-43.
19. Id. (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
20. Id. at 41-43.
21. Id. at 40.
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merce; (3) the defendant was employed by or was associated with the
enterprise; (4) the defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of
the enterprise; (5) through a pattern of racketeering activity. '22
The court based its holding on several recent Supreme Court cases ar-
ticulating congressional authority to legislate under the Commerce
Clause.23 In Lopez, the Supreme Court found that a federal statute
criminalizing the possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of any school
was unconstitutional.24 The Court held that Congress can only enact laws
under its commerce power to regulate: (1) channels of interstate com-
merce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.25 In Morrison, the
Court considered whether congressional authority to regulate gender-
based crimes via the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") passed
constitutional muster.2 6 Rejecting the argument that gender-based
crimes were economic in nature, the Court noted that in all previous
cases, where it allowed for the aggregation of conduct to establish a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce, the conduct was "economic" in
nature.27 The Court further reasoned that "the suppression of violent
crime" is a power traditionally reserved to the states, rejecting the argu-
ment that "Congress may [not] regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate com-
merce." 28 In Raich, the Supreme Court held that the classification of ma-
rijuana as a controlled substance by the Controlled Substances Act
["CSA"] was constitutional as applied to the noncommercial cultivation
of marijuana for medicinal purposes.29 Distinguishing Lopez, the Court
reasoned that the classification of marijuana as a controlled substance
was "merely one of many 'essential part[s] of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity was regulated." 30 Moreover, the Court drew par-
allels between Raich and its previous holding in Wickard v. Filburn, find-
ing that medicinal marijuana was a fungible commodity and therefore
could be aggregated to establish a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
31
Although the Nascimento majority referenced Morrison and Lopez, it
relied almost exclusively on Raich to decide the case, finding it to be
"more directly on point" than the other Supreme Court cases because
they were facial-rather than as-applied-challenges. 32 The majority ac-
22. Id. at 31 (citing United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 33 (1st Cir. 2002)).
23. See id. at 40-43.
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
25. Id. at 558-59.
26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
27. Id. at 613.
28. Id. at 617-18.
29. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
30. Id. at 24-25 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
31. Id. at 18-19; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115, 125-28 (1942).
32. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007).
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knowledged that Raich could be distinguished from the present facts be-
cause it dealt with the regulation of a fungible commodity, but
nevertheless disregarded the distinction as insignificant. 33 Instead, the
court focused on the overall class of conduct sought to be regulated, stat-
ing that a statute withstands constitutional scrutiny as long as the "statute
itself deals rationally with a class of activity that has a substantial rela-
tionship to interstate or foreign commerce. '34 Examining the majority
and concurrence of Raich, the court reasoned that the overall class of
conduct-economic racketeering activities-should not be dissected to
exclude noneconomic racketeering acts. 35 Further, the majority reasoned
that because the class of activities regulated by RICO was economic in
nature, judicial scrutiny should extend no further than whether Congress
had a rational basis for determining that noneconomic, intrastate murder
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 36 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the majority found that Congress did have a rational basis because
violent crime often goes hand-in-hand with racketeering.
37
In his concurring opinion, Justice Boudin agreed with the majority's
decision that RICO was constitutional as applied to the facts of the case,
but preferred to base his decision on the nexus to commerce. 38 Instead of
classifying the activities of the enterprise as noneconomic, Justice Boudin
classified Stonehurst's conduct as "the use of guns to kill people as a part
of a criminal enterprise. ... "39 This conduct thus established a nexus to
commerce that he felt was "at least as strong" as the nexus present in
felon-in-possession statutes, stating that congressional authority to regu-
late a gun that had once been in commerce surely translates into author-
ity to "regulate an enterprise that uses such guns to kill."' 40 By reaching
this decision, Justice Boudin avoided any application of Raich, preferring
what he claimed to be an "easier" route to upholding the constitutionality
of RICO as applied to the facts of Nascimento.
41
The Nascimento decision is based on an unremarkable synthesis of
Raich, Morrison, and Lopez, giving little regard to the nuances that are
pervasive in Commerce Clause analysis. The opinion calls into question
the rational coexistence of recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause
cases, and, if upheld, will effectively render Morrison and Lopez empty
vessels. Moreover, the prohibition of as-applied challenges to RICO
does not further the underlying purpose of the overall regulatory statute,
as the conduct in question was not within the purview of congressional





37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 51-52 (Boudin, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 52.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 53.
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federalism by empowering Congress to infringe upon police powers tradi-
tionally reserved for the states.
In essence, the Nascimento majority incorrectly used Raich as a sword
to break down the barriers established by Morrison and Lopez, effec-
tively turning commerce analysis on its head. The majority covertly ac-
complished this by its matter-of-fact statement that Raich prohibits as-
applied constitutional challenges when the provision in question is part of
a larger regulatory scheme. 42 In reality, the majority failed to assess the
significance of the ruling in Raich that an as-applied challenge will fail if
the individual application is essential to the enforcement of the overall reg-
ulatory scheme.43 In Raich, the fungible nature of medicinal marijuana
played a crucial role in the Court's decision because it increased the like-
lihood that the medicinal marijuana would make its way into the illegal
drug market, hindering the government's ability to effectively enforce the
CSA. 44 In contrast, the use of RICO to prosecute an enterprise's
noneconomic criminal conduct does not help the government curtail
traditional racketeering acts because noneconomic racketeering and
traditional racketeering are fundamentally different-one does not in-
crease the "supply" or "demand" of the other.
Additionally, the court blatantly ignored the detail with which the Su-
preme Court harmonized Raich with existing Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. Specifically, the Court's classification of medicinal marijuana as a
fungible commodity affecting the supply and demand of the illegal drug
market enabled the Court to preserve its statement in Morrison that ag-
gregation had never been allowed to establish a substantial effect on com-
merce where the conduct in question was noneconomic. 45 However, the
Fifth Circuit's refusal to recognize the significance of this distinction cre-
ates discord with previous Supreme Court jurisprudence, because it effec-
tively allows for the regulation of noneconomic conduct. 46 In addition,
no language in Raich specifically overruled any previous Supreme Court
holdings.47 Because this principle has been consistent throughout the his-
tory of the Court and was the foundation of its recent decisions in Morri-
son and Lopez, it is unlikely the Court intended Raich to quietly reverse
precedent.
Further compounding the First Circuit's illogical synthesis of existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence is the fact that the application of RICO to
noneconomic criminal conduct does not further RICO's underlying pur-
pose. The legislative history of RICO clearly establishes that the congres-
sional intent behind its enactment was to enable the government to
counteract the economic harm of organized crime and the assimilation of
42. Id. at 41 (majority opinion).
43. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).
44. Id. at 28.
45. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
46. Id.
47. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 15-19.
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such crime into legitimate businesses. 48 In this respect, Nascimento is
markedly different from Raich, where the underlying purpose of the CSA
was to regulate the flow of illegal drugs-which encompassed both me-
dicinal and illicit marijuana due to their fungible nature.49 As such, it was
entirely logical for the Court to reason that Congress had a rational basis
for regulating the growth of medicinal marijuana. In contrast, it is highly
illogical to reason that Congress had a rational basis for seeking to regu-
late noneconomic, intrastate criminal conduct where the underlying pur-
pose of RICO itself seeks to regulate only economic racketeering acts. In
reality, the decision to use RICO to prosecute noneconomic criminal con-
duct reeks more of prosecutorial abuse than a congressionally mandated
rational basis.
Furthermore, the First Circuit's decision to apply RICO to
noneconomic criminal conduct offends notions of federalism and, if fol-
lowed, will create a slippery slope broadening congressional reach to en-
compass all police powers traditionally reserved to the several states. The
Supreme Court has held that "[t]he regulation and punishment of intra-
state violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or
goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of
the States."' 50 Finding VAWA unconstitutional, Morrison rejected the ar-
gument that "Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal con-
duct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. '51 However, this is exactly the activity the Nascimento major-
ity allowed congressional commerce power to reach.52 The clarity of the
holdings in Morrison and Cohens v. Virginia suggest the Supreme Court
did not intend this structural divide to be demolished by an obscure inter-
pretation of one of its Commerce Clause decisions; however, Nasci-
mento's interpretation of Raich accomplishes this very feat by extending
congressional reach and subjecting Morrison, Lopez, and Cohens to the
whim of Congress's enigmatic "rational basis."
In conclusion, the First Circuit erred in finding that the application of
RICO to noneconomic criminal activity withstands constitutional scru-
tiny. The majority should have been more cautious in treating Raich as a
per se prohibition of as-applied constitutional challenges where the provi-
sion in question is part of a larger regulatory scheme. Moreover, the ma-
jority should have decided the case in accordance with existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence by finding that the noneconomic nature of the con-
duct in question could not be aggregated to establish a substantial effect
48. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26, 28 (1983).
49. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566
(1995) ("The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power .... ");
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 426 (1821) ("Congress has ... no general right to punish
murder committed within any of the States.").
51. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
52. See id. at 618 ("[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression
of violent crime .... ).
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on commerce, and that the Constitution prohibits congressional regula-
tion of general police powers traditionally reserved to the states. The
majority should have then looked to the underlying purpose of RICO and
determined that Congress could not have had a rational basis for includ-
ing noneconomic criminal conduct under the scope of RICO. If allowed
to stand, the majority's decision will greatly expand not only congres-
sional reach, but will also give prosecutors unbridled discretion to pursue
a broad assortment of criminal activities under RICO. Therefore, the
case should be reversed according to already established Commerce
Clause case law.
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